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Abstract 
High-technology work fuels a dynamic global exchange from technopoles throughout the 
world, but especially between East and South Asia and the Northern Californian region of 
Silicon Valley.  This migration drives an expanded number of ancestral identities.  
Professional and activity-based identities flourish as Silicon Valley’s strong narrative of 
meritocracy loosens the grip of birth ascription on the creation of identities.  These 
achieved identities proliferate as people experiment on their own sense of self.  
Traditional conceptual tools related to immigration, and even such contemporary 
approaches as Appadurai’s ethnoscapes, did not adequately illuminate the ethnographic 
data on Silicon Valley workers, families, and especially, youth.  The concept of deep 
diversity, first posed by philosopher Charles Taylor and reified by anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz, reinterprets the interactions of traditional ethnic identity categories, providing a 
powerful framework with which to think.  
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What we need are ways of thinking that are responsive to particularities, to 
individualities, oddities, discontinuities, contrasts, and singularities, 
responsive to what Charles Taylor has called ‘deep diversity,’ a plurality of 
ways of belonging and being, and that yet can draw from them—from it— 
a sense of connectedness, a connectedness that is neither comprehensive or 
uniform, primal nor changeless, but nonetheless real.”   (Geertz, 2000: 
224). 
Silicon Valley, even during periodic economic recessions, remains the hub of a 
dynamic global flow of technologies, funds and ideas among silicon places throughout 
the world.  People, especially from East and South Asia, sojourn to Northern California 
for education and work, adding to the region’s cultural mix.  This migration is an 
extension of earlier agricultural labor mobility, which together creates a complex 
repertoire of identities based on nationality and ancestry.  Professional and activity-based 
identities flourish and Silicon Valley’s strong narrative of meritocracy undermines the 
grip of birth ascription on the creation of identities.  A variant of the American Dream, 
the pervasive “garage myth” suggests that a good invention or creative application, 
pursued with entrepreneurial zeal, can change the fate of any person.  Hewlett-Packard 
began in a garage, as did Apple, and the narrative comes out of the mouths of political 
leaders and adolescent gamers alike.  Privileging achievement over birth status 
encourages experimentation on self in which identities proliferate.  In this article, I will 
discuss the problems inherent in studying a region whose culture has become iconic─ in 
which people are globally connected, technologically literate, and self-conscious of the 
advantages cosmopolitan identities confer in the new economy.  In such a postmodern 
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site, traditional conceptual tools related to immigration, and even such contemporary 
approaches as Appadurai’s ethnoscapes, do not adequately illuminate the ethnographic 
data on Silicon Valley’s workers, families, and youth.  Deep diversity adds the missing 
component. 
In this article, I trace my own search for a conceptual framework robust and 
elastic enough for me to adapt to the Silicon Valley context, and in turn produce new 
conceptual insights.   The concept of deep diversity, first posed by Canadian political 
philosopher Charles Taylor and reified by anthropologist Clifford Geertz, reinterprets the 
interactions of traditional ethnic identity categories. First posed as a political model for 
creating a multicultural Canada, the idea of deep diversity can be adapted to help 
anthropologists think about global urban interactions.   Deep diversity posits that cultural 
practices reflect significant differences, and cannot be dismissed or channeled into 
superficial holidays.  This model also suggests that as categories multiply and become 
dense within a particular region, maintaining discrete identities becomes more difficult. 
Aspects of particular heritage identities are exaggerated, minimized, co-opted and 
contested.   Through social contact both intimate and glancing, new hybrid identities 
occur.  These differences are also dynamic, constantly changing as landscapes of power 
select for some cultural activities, and drive others into the background.  Power relations, 
such as class-based racism, will still appear, but the ambiguity introduced by the 
discourse of meritocracy, leads to new strategies of interaction.  If Silicon Valley’s 
optimism, privileged economic niche and symbolic capital were to erode, it would 
certainly not be as clear an illustration of deep toleration. Nonetheless, by taking Taylor’s 
model and introducing it to a new context—the interpretation of ethnographic data—deep 
 7 
diversity is made less abstract, becoming the kind of middle-level theory that can generate 
new insights.  By examining identity management in the Silicon Valley region in light of 
deep diversity, I can elaborate and operationalize the notion.   
I begin retracing my steps by focusing on particular aspects of Silicon Valley 
culture.  Much of the information about the region has been the product of a two-decade-
long program, the Silicon Valley Cultures Project.
1 
Composed of numerous research 
endeavors, large and small; the information in this article comes from several projects in 
which research was focused on the connection between identities, the interactions of 
people enacting different identities, and innovation.  Understanding these differences, 
however, was difficult given that many of our ideas about situational identity were rooted 
in slower and simpler social processes.  Silicon Valley, like many other places, is globally 
connected, and these connections are rapid and each connection interacts with others.  
The dynamism of situational identification and intercultural interaction in Silicon Valley 
was startling, especially among its youth.  The cultural differences that did exist ran deep, 
but nonetheless could constantly be reworked.  Specific stories from Silicon Valley 
students and workers illustrate these discoveries.  The geography of identity and 
interaction highlighted another facet of cosmopolitan identity work; Silicon Valley’s 
diversity was complex, and this complexity reshaped the landscape into a new order of 
phenomenon.  Complex diversity was not just more of the same old story, it was a new 
story.  The discovery of the theoretical concept deep diversity reshaped my own research 
questions, and reordered the analysis of the observations. I will discuss these ideas, and 
how Taylor’s model changed when translated from abstract suggestions of how a 
 8 
multicultural society should unfold to explanations of how such a site actually behaves.  
That revised notion allows me to rethink the properties and practices of diversity.   
 
SILICON VALLEY, NEXUS OF A GLOBAL NETWORK 
Silicon Valley is an elastic and imaginary designation, with boundaries that 
expand and contract with the global high-technology economy, but are no less real than 
boundaries imposed by governmental decree. Situated in northern California, at the 
southern end of the San Francisco Bay Area, it can be seen as a physical space with a 
focused economic niche, a short-hand for regional marketing to attract businesses, or a 
postmodern imagined state of mind that embraces technology and entrepreneurial risk. It 
is not a governmental entity, and the region overlaps loosely with Santa Clara, San Mateo 
and parts of Santa Cruz and Alameda counties, hence data about it will shift depending on 
the unit of accounting. 
 Silicon Valley is a region with a specialized economic niche, the production of 
disruptive technologies, that is, technical inventions that change the direction of research, 
development, production and consumption.  Personal computers were not just smaller 
versions of large corporate or governmental mainframe computers; their designers 
rethought the technical frameworks for interaction and application (e.g. the graphical user 
interface, the mouse and the shift from numerical computing to word-based production 
and gaming).  Silicon Valley has been at the heart of many such disruptions to the 
trajectory of technology development and consciously celebrates its own creativity.   The 
opportunity and rewards for this creativity have transformed the former prune capital of 
the world into a magnet for national and global migration, drawing in highly educated 
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migrants to populate the high-tech sector, and more humble migrants to labor in schools, 
shops and construction.   Considered to be a core regional advantage, the act of bringing 
people from different parts of the United States and the world,  and asking them to work 
across cultural differences, requires creative professionals to be more flexible and 
innovative (English-Lueck, 2002).    
 Several structural changes in American immigration policy made this 
transformation possible.  In the aftermath of the 1965 Hart-Celler Act, immigration 
increased from Asia, from 4% in 1901-1920 to 39% during the period from 1980-1993. 
The 1990 amendment to the immigration laws expanded the use of H1-B visas to recruit 
skilled workers, particularly from India and greater China. These visas allow individuals 
with distinctive intellectual or technical skills to get residency to work and live in the 
United States.  Migration from South and East Asia exploded and the region is now a 
minority majority space, where foreign-born and “people of color” numerically dominate 
(see Banerjee, 2006; Center for Immigration Studies, 1995). 
Although using census categories is problematic, and even contrary to the way I 
maintain identity works in the region, it is pragmatic to describe the region using those 
older categories of diversity.  Silicon Valley has 2.9 million people, 40% of whom are 
“white, non-Hispanic,” 29% are Asian, 25% Hispanic, 2.6% Black non-Hispanic and less 
than one per cent are Native American, in spite of the fact that the Bay Area is home to 
one of the largest populations of urban Indians (Henton, 2010:2). Forty-five thousand 
people in the cities of San Jose/Sunnyvale/Santa Clara identify as belonging to two or 
more “races” (Census Bureau, 2006b). In the 2000 census, 60% of California's mixed 
race births occurred in Santa Clara county, the primary administrative unit in Silicon 
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Valley (Stern, 2005:5). While 12% of the nation is foreign born, 36% of the legal 
immigrants and sojourners to Silicon Valley were born outside the United States, 58% of 
them were born in Asia (Henton, 2010:2; Hirschman, 2005:598). Linguistically, nearly 
half, 48%, speak a language other than English at home, and of those linguistically 
diverse people, 43% speak an Asian or Pacific Islander language (Henton, 2010:13). 
The ethnoscape, the cultural landscape of the region is distinctive.  Appadurai 
emphasizes the imaginary and the ephemeral in his conceptualization of ethnoscape (see 
Appadurai 1996:33).  However, the Silicon Valley social milieu created by the interaction 
of immigrant, work and hybrid identities is strikingly stable and nimble.  Silicon Vikings 
from Scandinavia bring their families, who are schooled with Dinka Lost Boys from the 
Sudan.  Meanwhile, the eight thousand or so Native Americans in San Jose (and 
immediate environment) struggle to maintain tribal distinctions while they are surrounded 
by larger ethnic groups (Christie, 1997; Ramirez, 2007). In that situation, cultural 
exchange is rampant, and Native California tribal peoples are dominated by the more 
vocal and numerous Lakota from the Midwest, or by Latinos who identify with the 
Aztecas.  Shankar, in her ethnography of adolescent Desi, a vernacular term for Indo-
Americans, in Silicon Valley documents a similar phenomenon. In high schools where 
there is a critical mass, differentiation occurs. Students who speak Punjabi group 
together; those who are a similar class status connect around Desi bling, jewelry and cars. 
However, minority Indians, such as Tamil speakers, have to become more generically 
Indian and perhaps even pick up Punjabi slang. At one high school, where they are 
marginal, Desi students adopt the make-up and dress of Latina students (Shankar, 2003; 
2006). 
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To illustrate the intricacy of global identities, I will focus my examples to a brief 
discussion of the diasporic Chinese. Even within this relatively narrow channel, the 
complexity of interactions and global reach is apparent. The history of Chinese 
immigration to the San Francisco Bay Area runs deep. The diversity of diasporic 
experiences is fundamental to the differentiation of Chinese in this region. From the Gold 
Rush era, through the building of the railroad, “Sino-California” is build into the fabric of 
the State (Starr, 2005:119). Nineteenth century ethnic migratory labor in agriculture and 
commerce established a Cantonese Chinese presence in the Bay Area, made painful by 
intense racism. The great grandchildren of those early immigrants intermarried with other 
ethnic groups, and became increasingly less distinctively Chinese and more Asian 
Californian. San Francisco State University was the site of the first ethnic studies 
program promoting an Asian American consciousness (Teraguchi, 2004).  The scale of 
migration from Greater China means that categories such as “Chinese” can be parsed 
much more finely.  Large groups, such as the Chinese, have so much critical mass that 
they can afford to differentiate themselves—Chinese from Taiwanese from Tainan (in the 
South) distinguish themselves from those from Taipei (in the north), Chinese from 
Shanghai differentiate themselves from Beijing émigrés (see Wong, 2006:190). 
The earlier diasporas used kinship and place of origin to form viable commercial 
networks in the new environment. In the United States education in particular was a core 
focus for Chinese families. The overseas Chinese of North America are the best educated 
in the global diaspora (Peng, 2002:431-432). In Santa Clara County 64.5% of the Chinese 
have a university degree, including post-graduate degrees (Census Bureau, 2006a). The 
older diasporic community continues to provide a base through which new migrants can 
 12 
flow. Hua Wong, an ethnic Chinese Burmese immigrant and prototype manufacture 
inspector for a large computer company, began her residency in the Bay Area in San 
Francisco. There she did piece work sewing garments for Cantonese employers. From 
there she, and her family, used high-tech employment for social mobility, first in 
manufacturing, and once her children were educated, in design. 
The virulent racism that created the Chinese Exclusion Acts of 1882, 1892 and 
1902 was modified by a century of co-existence, but influenced intercultural interaction 
more subtly. In the Bay Area, the era of “coolies” was gone, but the advent of “high-tech 
or techno-coolies” had begun. Immigration to the Silicon Valley region, from 1985-2000 
was dominated by Chinese; 37% of immigrants were from China, 13% from Taiwan, and 
3% from Vietnam, including many ethnic Chinese (Saxenian, 2006:53). In the 1980s the 
new diasporic Chinese were placed in technical positions. There was some pay disparity, 
although that disparity eroded over the next decade (Saxenian, 2006:55; Wong, 2006:36). 
However, access to management and entrepreneurial opportunities were more critical 
than the monetary glass ceiling. Assumed language barriers, embodied restraint and 
repression of competitive lust were seen as barriers to effective management by non-
Asian co-workers. In short, the subtler stereotypes of habitus kept the new Chinese from 
developing the reputations needed to excel in the business side of high-technology; they 
were kept behind cubicle walls. The biases are less overt, but nonetheless formed a 
statistically significant barrier (Shih, 2006; Varma, 2002:337).   
Chinese immigrants responded with a variety of strategies to circumvent these 
barriers by creating professional organizations, using transnational personal networks to 
get a technical edge, and mentoring incoming immigrants (Varma, 2002:356). The 
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diasporic Chinese community built active networks to rival the non-Asian “old boys” 
who had dominated companies and laboratories. As they form ethnically-based or 
transnational entrepreneurial companies, they job-hop to maximize individual success 
(Shih, 2006:188).  We can see examples of this pattern in the professional organizations 
that form platforms for Chinese networking. Some are Asian-American, using English 
language media. Monte Jade Science and Technology Associate court ties with Taiwan, 
while the Silicon Valley Chinese Engineers or the North American Chinese 
Semiconductor Association pursue ties to the People's Republic of China. Typically 
presentations include modeling successful entrepreneurs or managers and provide a 
forum for technical and market information. Unlike prior diasporas, local origin and 
family connections move to the background while skills and company affiliation move to 
the foreground (Saxenian, 2006:61-63; Wong, 2006:59). Even non-Chinese participate in 
these professional organizations when English is the lingua franca. 
Silicon places are networked together through the actions of individuals and 
organizations. The Hsinchu-Taipei corridor evolved out of a combination of 
entrepreneurial efforts and strategic Taiwanese governmental policies, including 
promoting overseas Chinese investment. Efforts such as Aspire Park used creativity and 
technical expertise, cultural elements picked up during the glass ceiling era in Silicon 
Valley, to change work culture in Taiwan. In the 1980s Acer, a leading Taiwanese 
manufacturer, established an outpost in Silicon Valley to do software research and 
development (Tsai, 2006). By 2000 Taiwan had created “substantially more patents per 
capita than the other newly industrialized countries in Asia” (Saxenian, 2006:125).  A 
new landscape of power had been created.  The meteoric economic success of the 
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People’s Republic in the first decade of the 21
st
 century has changed the way Chinese 
immigrants are viewed.  
The groupings used to define ethnicity are not power-neutral.   Race and ethnicity 
become proxies for class, as the descriptive statistics about these categories and education 
reveal. Graduation rates underscore the power differences in ethnic communities, scaling 
from Hispanic students whom the dropout rate is nearly 20% to Asian students at 5%.  
Although Latino students comprise 33% of the high school student population, only 24% 
of those high school graduates qualify for University.  For Asians, who have 23% of the 
high school population, 68% meet the requirements to attend public universities (Henton, 
2010: 30).  
In spite of these numbers, and others that indicate that structural racism and 
classism has not vanished from Silicon Valley institutions, there is a powerful cultural 
discourse of self-agency.  As migrants make the transition from natal cultural 
identification to “belonging to Silicon Valley culture,” they repeat the narrative of 
meritocracy.  Individual accomplishment is privileged and places the burden of success 
and failure on the individual.  People believe themselves, as individuals, to be responsible 
for their fates and bear the social and emotional responsibility for life-long learning and 
strategic planning.  This means that individuals constantly walk a fine line between 
needing to change, “re-inventing” themselves, and staying in larger categories that can 
provide a sense of community.   
The elasticity of identity takes the notion of situational identity, enacting different 
representations of self to different stakeholders as contexts change, to a new levels of 
nuance.  Situational identity is constantly being, to use a technological metaphor, 
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“refreshed” and changed.  Cultural identities were being built around social and 
recreational activities, gender conceptions and preferences, religious and political beliefs, 
and various mixtures of the above.  This malleability makes identity less easy to classify 
and use in any meaningful way in daily interaction.  In doing research on identity in 
Silicon Valley, I was struck by how rarely I encountered identity certainty, but instead 
saw people struggling with ambiguity.   As Mr. Jefferies, one of the mentors in a local 
high school notes, “[On this campus] “you can’t possibly identify [students] by looking at 
them.  I think it a much more diverse environment for us and for our children to be in.  
People [are] negotiating it.” For these Silicon Valley youth, cultural bridges are being 
constructed to connect the different communities.  The national, ethnic and cultural 
identities of the students, and their adult teachers and peers, were diverse indeed.  People 
identified a number of ancestral affiliations besides European origins including Latino, 
Native American, Chinese, Thai, Korean , Japanese, Vietnamese, Iranian, Ethiopian and 
African-American.   They also identified themselves into behavioral categories such as 
“gay,” “queer” or “geeks.”  Networking across and among the cultural categories was 
daily work.   
SITUATIONAL IDENTITY 2.0 
In Silicon Valley, the increased density of differences, and their distribution, will 
mean that some identities are narrow and intense, while others are broad and diffuse. 
Cultural differences are more than speaking a different language or celebrating a 
particular festivals, being different provides alternative structures of meaning. In one set 
of circumstances, a narrow definition matters, such as being a Microsoft certified 
software engineer from Shanghai. Under other conditions, that same person may be 
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drawn into identification with Silicon Valley, as his son comes home to describe the joys 
of gaining rank in the game World of Warcraft. People do what appear to be the same 
things for quite different reasons. Sometimes this leads to the familiar world of attributive 
stereotyping.  At other times, new frameworks of meaning are created, as Taiwanese 
engineers reinvent themselves as Silicon Valley-style entrepreneurs. The complexity of 
difference, given the dynamics of the global urban landscape, can both foment fusion and 
sharpen demarcations. The resulting experimentation in culture, effects change for 
individuals, communities and transnational policies. 
Cindy Chen illustrates how this dance of situational representation occurs among 
young people. Cindy is the center of one of networks my colleagues and I studied to 
understand the global reach of youth networks.  She is sixteen, born in Texas, although 
her mother and sister are from Taiwan. After moving to Silicon Valley, her father died, 
leaving Mrs. Chen a widow supporting two young women by doing accounting work at a 
fiber optic firm. She spoke Japanese as a child and is thrilled that her daughter is studying 
Japanese. She is even more thrilled that in spite of spurning Chinese Saturday school, 
Cindy still can speak Mandarin to friends and relatives from Taiwan. To Mrs. Chen, 
Cindy is a good girl, studious, focused on getting into a good university and law program. 
Cindy's Asianness only partly stems from her language competency. Being on the nearly 
all-Asian school badminton team, as are the other teams from eastern San Jose, is as 
much a part of her cultural practice as keeping her linguistic skills intact. Her best friends 
are Vietnamese, also in badminton and also studying Japanese.   As Cindy moves through 
her day, she engages in habitus code-switching (see Bourdieu, 1998). Her exposure to 
supposedly similar people differentiates her, and her life with “others” gives her 
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platforms for identity. Her networks are the critical glue that link households, families 
and their globally dispersed kin and colleagues (Darrah et al 2007). Are her connections 
from the Silicon Valley region to the Asian Pacific nodes of Vietnam, Taiwan and Japan? 
What exactly is flowing in the global flows and how is it being fused with other 
elements?  Her family and network reside within structured flows, shaped by immigration 
policies, and the regional economy. Larger scale sociopolitical interactions (e.g. 
international educational exchange or the legacy of  Japanese rule in Taiwan) shape other 
aspects of her experience of diversity.  
Cindy’s friend, Tran, a Vietnamese-American,  is also an advanced student of 
Japanese and involved in the same Advanced Placement courses. Tran just began her first 
job doing karaoke style recording for tourists at an amusement park.  She frequently chats 
with her friends using an instant messaging application on her computer about alternative 
rock/pop music. Julio is Cindy's online buddy and a classmate from Algebra 2. For a time 
he pursued her as a possible girl friend, and still thinks her “cool.” He is eighteen and 
planning to go to a culinary academy. He is estranged from his mother and considers the 
African-American-Filipino family of his ex-girlfriend his second family. His father and 
grandfather have moved back to Mexico. Julio spends five hours a day on instant 
messaging, finding it a more real and intimate form of communication than telephone or 
face to face. One of his best friends is Matt, part of the e-circle and network Julio calls his 
“Mexican buddies,” or the group he calls, “yomutta.” Of course, Matt's “not actually, but 
might as well be Mexican.” Matt talks the talk, eats the food and lives his life as if he 
were Latino. In Matt's, Julio's and Cindy's world, actually having the ancestry is one of 
the criteria, but not even a necessary one, of formulating an identity. Silicon Valley teens 
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are experimenting on themselves—mixing ethnic and other identities to develop 
relationships across groups (see Shankar, 2003:130). Not all teens actually bear this out in 
daily behavior, but they do articulate that “mixing” groups, “not limiting” oneself to one 
set of practices, is “cool.” 
When framing the identities of Cindy and her friends, notice the significant bias 
that we scholars of diversity unconsciously enact.  We tend to assume a priori that actual 
ancestry is necessary for identity. As Julio and Matt illustrate, must this be the case? 
Asianness, even Chineseness, is not exclusively enacted by people whose ancestors, 
however distant, came from China. Of course, orientalism, selective cultural borrowing 
by the European and American dominant society, is a well established phenomenon. 
However, living in complex and shifting diversity makes traditional cultural guideposts 
more ambiguous, and reshuffling and reinvention are facilitated. 
How many kinds of cultural interactions could Cindy Chen have in her urban high 
school?  To answer that question, I examined the linguistic and cultural categories 
represented in the region’s primary and secondary educational ethnoscape.  I engaged in 
the following thought experiment, contrasting a relatively simple ethnoscape with Silicon 
Valley’s cultural mosaic.  Not to understate the existing complexity, the area north of 
Flagstaff Arizona has Hopi and Navajo, defined by the State and by well-worn, if often 
challenged, linguistic and familial criteria. Bahana, or if speaking Dine, bilagaana 
European descendents comprise the “other.” With only three categories, seven overall 
interactions are possible (each can interact within the category, between any two 
categories and between all three). Calculating the complexity of cultural interactions in 
the Silicon Valley region, using a conservative minimum of 50 linguistic/ethnic 
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categories, 1.125 quadrillion interactions were possible! Given that 50 was a number 
derived from gross linguistic and nationally based ancestral categories, adding other 
criteria for cultural identity, such as region, religion, passionate dedication to Steve Job's 
Apple vision, drives the complexity of the diverse interactions into astronomical numbers 
(English-Lueck, 2002:117, 137). Transnational interaction and communication change the 
ethnic experience. The very complexity of diversity in a global city makes it much less 
predictable and more ambiguous. Alternate forms of identity, not based on heritage, 
interact with traditional categories of ethnicity as emerging identities compete or are 
coupled with those ancestrally-based statuses. 
The way in which the vague realms of global and local are connected is rife with 
anthropological assumptions, what Moore calls “pre-theoretical commitments” to a 
particular way of conceptualizing culture. If you see culture as holistic and totalizing that 
sends you in one direction, struggling to fit the local into the global. A world systems 
approach would be an example of the former, trying to see how structures of capitalism 
shape a particular locale. Aspects of Appadurai's Ptolemaic “scape” spheres (ethnoscape, 
technoscape etc.) similarly emphasize transnational interactions within particular realms, 
reinforcing particular domains such as economy, migration, and technology (Appadurai, 
1996). Alternatively, if culture is viewed as a bricolage—a fragmented and chaotic 
construction—that perspective privileges a different interpretation of global-local 
interaction.  Appadurai has created a typology with this metaphorical “scapes” that 
applaud the anarchic and emphasize “the disjunctive” (Moore, 2004: 79). Similarly, 
anthropologist Tsing is comfortable with a turbulent globalization in which higher order 
processes meet the local in a process she calls “friction” (Tsing, 2005). This approach 
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esteems the particular, the ethnographically local individualized experience. While it is 
possible to use both approaches, the holistic and the fragmented, to move systematically 
from the individual, through the neighborhood, region, and nation to the transnational—
neither approach does so comfortably. A structured approach lends itself to emphasizing 
governmentalities, so that the structures of political power—city, state and nation—
become the default categories of social analysis. The more anarchic approach makes an 
orderly scale almost inconceivable. What is a region, if the interactions between local and 
global are imagined and fragmentary? Anthropologists, need to embrace both the lived 
experiences of a human beings and broad global structures, and so need another tool to 
help them organize their thinking about different scales of interaction. 
I would like to insert another conceptual approach into this theoretical space, one 
that can potentially bridge the two diverse poles. Although Taylor has a heavy “pre-
theoretical commitment” to the nation as a totalizing concept, there is a deceptive amount 
of flexibility in his idea of deep diversity. This concept problematizes ethnic identity 
categories. However, his idea of deep diversity is heuristic, it can be taken farther than he 
has himself taken it. Taylor argues that there are different levels of political engagement 
in a multicultural context. Simply identifying differences in culture and outlook, but 
assuming that all are ultimately under a single undifferentiated national umbrella is “first 
level diversity.” Diversity is this mode is a shallow concept, referring to the maintenance 
of memory and tradition at the local level, but relative homogeneity within the nation-
state. In this model, moral panic is engendered as people worry about “losing” their 
distinctive identities, becoming a “disappearing culture.” Accepting that people as distinct 
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as Quebecois or Dene might view even belonging itself “in a very different way” points to 
deep diversity (Redhead, 2002b; Taylor, 1993). 
 The complexity of the cultural landscape in Silicon Valley, as in other global 
urban spaces, strains the explanatory power of the dominant anthropological theories of 
“difference.”   Like London, or Hong Kong, Silicon Valley is a hub for global flows of 
people and assumptions, material culture, and practices they bring.  However, the extreme 
discourse of meritocracy inherent in high-technology work, emphasizing pragmatism and 
achievement, undermines the identities that are birth ascribed—ethnicity, race, and even 
class status.  Coupled with a zeal for experimentation and innovation, embedded in 
Silicon Valley’s technical and corporate discourses, people tinker with their own 
identities.  They mix elements of their various ancestral and affinity-based identities into 
hybridized and syncretic blends, whose manifestations shift as people move from social 
context to social context.   Together, these approaches to identity management and 
intercultural interaction demand a more nuanced set of ideas to help explain them.  I 
found the kernel of that theoretical approach in the notion of deep diversity. 
DEEPENING DIVERSITY  
One way to look at diversity is to gaze at the past, framing identities around 
national ancestral categories, mourning the loss of tradition amidst globalization. In this 
framework, each generation beyond the actual act of immigration is homogenized into an 
amorphous whole. This melting pot metaphor is rife with a priori assumptions about the 
dynamism, or lack thereof, of local cultures. Silicon Valley, because of the historic 
circumstances of agrarian and high-technology global demographic flows, is an 
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experimental site for deep diversity. It in within this framework of deep diversity, and the 
deep toleration that accompanies it, that new culture is created. 
Deep diversity and deep toleration, as conceptual anthropological tools, grant a 
broader range of polities than that originally conceived by Taylor. He was concerned for 
the integrity of Canada, a nation state. However, there is no reason we cannot apply the 
lens of this notion to other political units—cities, regions, transnational groups of nations. 
Nor is there any absolute requirement that the basis of community be political, not based 
on some other social structure entirely. Deep diversity can be an analytical tool applied to 
families, schools, or whole regions. Silicon Valley is an example of a cultural entity that 
is not even an administrative unit, although it sometimes functions as a political 
economic force. Given its global interaction, it not even confined to one country. 
The notion provides for reworking and multiplying connections, even intensifying 
them (Geertz, 2000: 224, 247). Deep diversity is not theoretical framework that pushes an 
a priori commitment to either totalizing global homogenization or unfettered chaos.  
Instead, the apparent lack of common ground, the chaos, implied by diversity is pushed to 
the background of interactions.  New possibilities emerge as hybridization and creativity 
create the potential for new social contracts.  Those new commonalities move to the  
foreground of social interaction. The concept posits both the creation of commons and 
constant creative differentiation. When Taylor devised his vision, it was as a political 
philosopher, critiquing the political infrastructure of Canada to highlight a possible future 
in which diversity could flower. Geertz, as an anthropologist informed as much by 
philosophy as anthropology, saw it as a model that could help anthropologists describe 
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existing globalization using a “pre-theoretical commitment” to the value of cultural 
complexity. 
Charles Taylor has labored to conceptualize global differences, as experienced 
within a multicultural state polity so that some sort of stability can be achieved. He calls 
this condition deep diversity. Three facets distinguish deep diversity from its normative 
and somewhat shallow form.  First, this form of diversity recognizes that the practices of 
diversity are not superficial, but reflect deeply held beliefs about relationships, family, 
power and governmentality. Deep diversity at its core posits that complex differences 
exist, whole structures of meaning may separate people, and that people must actively 
engage in creating new commons for the basis of community. Some of that negotiation 
requires the creation of new identity categories. Second, deep diversity is complex, 
existing in shifting global urban landscapes that embrace dozens, if not hundreds, of 
interacting identities based on ancestry and affiliation.  Third, the search for a joint 
identity commons will be influenced by existing structures of power.  However, it is 
important to understand that those structures are in constant flux, being renegotiated as 
the political ethnoscape shifts.   
Charles Taylor's understanding of deep diversity is philosophical; he is basing his 
proposition for political interaction on reasoning through the particular historical case of 
French and “aboriginal” separatism in Canada. He is not utopian in his optimism. Taylor 
recognizes that it will be difficult to fashion a culturally meaningful commons that would 
allow deep diversity to be a productive basis for a polity. However, as scholars of his 
work have pointed out, his assumptions about politics, particularly identity politics, are 
deeply-rooted in an European and North American understanding. By placing the 
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emphasis on deep diversity, relationships are structurally centrifugal, emphasizing 
difference and making the creation of an identity commons difficult. Moreover, Taylor 
has a deeply held position that instrumentality and utilitarian impulses—the glue for 
relationships not based on a common identity—forms a poor basis for creating a cultural 
commons (Redhead, 1999:206). Such motives are insufficient, in his estimation, for 
creating a foundation for enduring communication. He finds deep diversity incompatible 
with the market forces and bureaucratic structures found in contemporary democracy 
unless a common good beyond the individual can be negotiated out of the diverse 
positions (Redhead, 2002a:9).  However, these are precisely the conditions that describe 
deep diversity in Silicon Valley.  
CULTURAL RELATIVISM FOR THE MASSES 
Coupled with the notion of deep diversity is the idea of deep toleration, a form of 
cultural competence in which people consciously grapple with cultural differences. In 
Taylor's view, one is meaningfully oneself only as part of a social web, “among other 
selves.” Deep toleration does not mean equal or unquestioning affirmation of all possible 
positions, nor does it mean privatizing difference so that it is hidden and out of view. 
Instead it means striving to find a common “horizon of significance,” to permit both more 
comprehensive understandings of others (Elshtain, 2004:131, 136-137). Emphasizing 
deep toleration is more centripetal, pulling together support for the creation of commons. 
Particularly under the social conditions of deep diversity, at the nexus of global flows, 
this promotes a “cosmopolitan viewpoint rooting individuals ...to an intercultural 
dynamic of cultural exchange” (Redhead, 1999:279). 
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 It is no surprise that Taylor's deep diversity comes to anthropology through 
Clifford Geertz. The assumption of embodied knowledge, the creation of webs of 
meaning, and the moral support of humanistic values of democratic choice are the 
Hegelian hermeneutic common ground. However, deep toleration should seem even more 
familiar to American anthropologists. At its heart, it harkens back to a specific form of 
cultural relativism, in which knowledge “evaluations are relative to the cultural 
background out of which they arise” (Hatch, 1983:3-5). Cultural relativism has had many 
forms, unfortunately referenced by the same two words. It involves the suspension of 
judgment during inquiry, understanding that applying rapid and ethnocentric judgments 
about another's practices and beliefs fundamentally undermine anthropological 
understanding. Although some would have it so, cultural relativism is not necessarily 
ethical relativism in which no judgment can ever be rendered. In a nuanced argument 
Elvin Hatch posits that while there are indeed no absolute or universal moral codes by 
which to judge, the “application of the humanistic principle to create ethic of tolerance 
without rampant moral relativism” allows anthropologists to retain the greatest assets of 
cultural relativism without engaging in moral evasion (1983:138). Such “humanism” is 
not a given, or specific to a particular culture, but is an affirmation of the dignity of 
human agency, “according people the freedom to be themselves,” a common ground 
whose particulars must be negotiated (Taylor, 1993:183-184). In this, we see an echo of 
the “horizon of significance” referenced by Taylor. People can negotiate their own new 
commons, new guideposts, that encompass multiple differences. This process uses deep 
toleration, “without the flaws of extreme relativism that come with the necessity of 
validation” (Elshtain, 2004:137). Instead, a person can be “open to the possibility that the 
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contrasting moral sources might offer a better language of self-interpretation than the 
moral sources one presently relies upon” (Redhead, 2002b:816). Such a position involves 
willingness to experiment with one’s self, ones practices and ones moral narratives. Deep 
toleration is cultural relativism for the masses.   
 Deep toleration poses challenges for anthropologists, as well as the communities 
we study. Power is still a real part of the negotiation for achieving a common good; it 
would be naive to think otherwise. Silicon Valley cities, Cupertino and Palo Alto, 
established elementary school level Chinese-immersion programs because of the 
economic power of Mandarin speakers.  The power of the local Chinese community made 
that option viable, if contested (see English-Lueck, 2003). However, when fourteen year-
old Kim says she likes Chinese music because her family watches Chinese music dubbed 
in Vietnamese, or Japanese music from anime, she is revealing differences in cultural 
authority. China and Japan have massive media infrastructures with tremendous global 
reach; Vietnam does not. Nonetheless, the acknowledgment of that power differential 
should not diminish Kim's right to negotiate something new, a sense of self situated in 
Asian California, which defines her search for a new commons. 
It is particularly instructive to look at Silicon Valley youth growing to 
consciousness under the conditions of deep diversity, who are redefining what 
philosophers might refer to as their “horizons of significance,” their sense of self-
meaning, beyond the categories into which they have been placed. They are not part of the 
airplane-flying cosmopolitan transnational elite, but they are daily exposed to multiple 
ways of being human (see Louie, 2000). These Silicon Valley youth are not unique in the 
region in their practice of deep toleration; the birthplace of such practices is probably the 
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high-tech workplace, and ripples extend into the surrounding service sector.  Middle-class 
workers, high and low, demonstrate such intercultural sufferance, and their children are 
thus enculturated.  However, the youth have embraced this ethos of tolerance and 
transformed it with new practices that challenge received identity categories.  As 
anthropologists have long known, it is difficult to accept received categories of ethnicity 
while viewing the processes of ethnic identity as “negotiable” (Stern, 2005). Although 
still influenced by class, caste and clique, teenagers in Silicon Valley are creating a 
distinctive set of values that comes close to enacting deep toleration.  The experimental 
ethos of Silicon Valley, which goes well beyond the populations directly involved in 
high-technology work, creates a distinctive context for deep diversity to thrive.  
 Deep toleration is reflected in Jenet’s comments about identity and interaction.  
Her comments reflect widely held position I encountered in doing fieldwork with Silicon 
Valley youth, from a variety of class and ethnic backgrounds and indicates the overlay of 
“Silicon Valley culture.”  She reluctantly identifies herself using the epithet, “Chinese-
American.” This 17-year-old student is active in the high school diversity club,  STAND, 
and in GSA (Gay Straight Alliance), occasionally attending events at the Billy DeFrank 
Center for education related to gender-identity.  She participates in International Relations 
(a model United Nations), and she has also attended workshops at San Jose State 
University. Jenet  tutors three days a week at her high school.  Jenet is passionate about 
human rights, but also a self-professed Japanese anime addict, a “blend of American and 
Chinese” culture.  She goes beyond Mr. Jeffries’ statement that classifying people is 
difficult, to reject the notion.  She decries “checking race/ethnicity is like, garbage ... I 
just keep going as I am now, just keep growing and learning and meeting people, 
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experiencing new things and just kind of developing, thinking, beliefs… I guess as long 
as I keep growing and not just stay stagnant, stay put, stuck ... flattened under a piece of 
paper like a flower forever, then I think I'd be okay. Cause everybody really needs to 
change and grow.”   
<insert photograph> 
Figure 1.  This poster fostering intercultural tolerance adorns secondary schools 
throughout Santa Clara County. By permission of the Santa Clara Network for a 
Hate-Free Community.   
In using deep diversity as a conceptual lever for understanding globalization, we 
must be both aware of power, and not overly taken with it. Deep toleration requires strict 
mental and ethical discipline, suspending judgment while not relinquishing the possibility 
of a considered moral decision. As a political philosophy, deep tolerance requires close 
listening to other views, and thoughtful reflection, not automatic affirmation. Cultural 
relativism, as an epistemological discipline for ethnographers, depends on walking a 
similarly difficult path.   
Taylor's political theories are among the few that do not privilege the majority, 
often a disguised synonym for the dominant ethnicity, without setting the conceptual 
stage for centrifugal balkanization. His is a struggle to recognize the value and dignity of 
difference, while not generating a polity prone to fragmentation. However, his vision rests 
on the co-creation of a common social and political good, a mutual referential framework. 
His articulation of a political commons can be made more complex, more suitable for 
discussions of globalization, by applying deep tolerance. Anthropologists often indulge 
themselves in philosophy, but do so armed with data. By populating the notion of deep 
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diversity with examples drawn from the experience of living people, we can provide tools 
for political theorists to act with more nuance and fewer a priori assumptions. 
Optimistic even when the volatile technology economy is down, Silicon Valley's 
self-created commons is based on an ethos of experimentation and productivity. While 
Taylor abhors the shallowness of instrumentality, Silicon Valley has made 
instrumentality, in its various forms, into a virtue. Pragmatism is the reason people are 
willing to suspend their judgment about cultural differences and work with others. Silicon 
Valley people value work, for it is their raison d'etre for being there. Their work ethic is 
based both on mastery and creating disruptive technologies, ways of doing things that are 
not simply copies of other approaches. The diversity of Silicon Valley contributes to that 
innovation. When differences are based on linguistics and culture, and people can bring 
genuinely different points of view to bear on problems, economic productivity is 
demonstrably enhanced (Alesina, 2005). Problem solving itself becomes the common 
ground for mediating differences.  People view their daily encounters with diversity as 
calisthenics for tolerance, creativity and self-reflection, necessary prerequisites for 
innovation (English-Lueck, 2002; 2010). 
Silicon Valley’s fascination with work, productivity, and creativity becomes a 
cultural commons—a mutually beneficial social contract that can allow differences to 
flourish, but not overwhelm.  Although this contract does not include everyone—
significant portions of the population do not view meritocracy as a concept that applies to 
them, those who do embrace it illustrate effective deep diversity.   Deep diversity 
provides an explanatory model for Silicon Valley in ways that Charles Taylor never 
intended.  Deep toleration describes a set of practices that provide a hint at how 
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Balkanization can be side-stepped.   The example of Silicon Valley’s deep diversity poses 
challenges for anthropologists to consider the social dynamics of the regions they study.  
Can the distinctive context of Silicon Valley be duplicated elsewhere?  What are the 
conditions by which simple diversity is converted into deep diversity?  What are the 
constraints to internalizing deep toleration?  Applying Taylor’s concepts allowed me to 
rework my inductive ethnographic craft in light of a distinctive analytical framework. In 
that moment, the ethnographic observations broadened and expanded the original 
theoretical framework of deep diversity and it left the domain of political philosophy to 
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